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Frequency Based Analysis of Voting Rules
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Abstract In a large electorate it is natural to consider voters’ preference profiles as frequency distribu-
tions over the set of all possible preferences. We assume coherence in voters’ preferences resulting in
accumulation of voters preferences. We show that such distributions can be studied via superpositions of
simpler so called unimodal distributions. At these, it is shown that all well-known rules choose the mode
as the outcome. We provide a set of sufficient conditions for a rule to have this trait of choosing the mode
under unimodal distributions. Further we show that Condorcet consistent rules, Borda rule, plurality rule
are robust under tail-perturbations of unimodal distributions.
Keywords Voting · Unimodal distribution · Condorcet consistent rule · Borda Rule · Plurality rule
JEL Classification D71, D72
1 Introduction
We focus on voting situations involving large numbers of voters like nation wide elections. In these
voting situations voters’ preferences over the candidates may vary considerably. On the other hand it is
reasonable to expect that cultural backgrounds, social media, individual networks etc. induce some coher-
ence between these voters’ preferences. Coherence expressed in one or several accumulations of voters’
preferences. Representing the voters’ preference combinations, or profiles, at such large electorates by
frequency distributions each accumulation can be seen as an agglomeration of preferences around a local
mode. In that way the whole profile can be viewed as the addition or superposition of such (local) uni-
modal distributions yielding a multimodal distribution. In this paper we study unimodal distributions and
how reasonable outcomes of these are related to reasonable outcomes at multimodal distributions.
Taking the set of linear orders over all candidates as the admissible set of preferences a profile is a
frequency distribution on this set of linear orders. This set is structured by the Kemeny distance counting
the number of discordant pairs as the distance between two such orders. This distance is the minimal
path-length needed to convert the one order into the other by swapping consecutively ordered candidates.
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Starting from one order at each step we arrive at a new order which has one discordant pair less with the
final order than the previous order on that path. A unimodal distribution is a distribution where one order,
the mode, has highest frequency and where further frequency decreases with the distance (in Kemeny
sense) from the mode. Multimodal distributions are considered to be additions of such unimodal distribu-
tion. It is very reasonable to choose the mode at unimodal distribution as many well-known choice rules
do so. Likewise when analysing multimodal distributions it appears natural to infer the outcome from the
intersection of the local modes. This opens the possibility to study such more general distributions via
unimodal ones.
We start with observing the behaviour of several well-known rules like Condorcet consistent rules,
Scoring rules, Elimination rules, Kemeny-like rules, under unimodal distributions. It is worth noting that
all these rules choose the mode as the outcome under unimodal distribution. We also provide a set of
sufficient conditions which ensures that any rule satisfying them choose the mode at a unimodal distribu-
tion. To investigate the robustness of this result we allow for disturbances in the tail part of a unimodal
distribution and show that even under this tail-perturbed distributions Condorcet consistent rules, Borda
rule and plurality rule chooses the mode as the outcome.
Intuitively, for many rules the property of choosing the mode follows because of the following. Let
at the mode candidate a be preferred to candidate b. Then a preference R at which a is preferred to b
is closer to the mode than the corresponding preference R′ at which the positions of a and b in R are
swapped. Therefore R has higher frequency than R′. Letting R run over the set of linear orders where a
is preferred to b lets consequently R′ run over the complementary set. So, in pairwise comparison a will
beat b and the mode consists of all pairs which in pairwise comparisons beat each other: the Condorcet
order. The same argument of R having higher frequency than R′ implies that at any score rule a gets a
higher score than b and that b is eliminated before a is. So, the mode also embodies the ”positional”
order as well as the order of ”elimination”. Formalising this intuition we get some sufficient conditions.
Besides anonymity and neutrality, there are two important conditions that are sufficient for this property
of choosing the mode, namely, discrimination and monotonicity. Here anonymity and neutrality are used
in their usual sense. Monotonicity and discrimination are formally defined in the following section. In
general monotonicity properties are restrictive and therefore not satisfied by reasonable collective decision
rules. The one discussed here is satisfied by many rules, for instance pairwise rules and score rules. It
demands that the pair ab is in the outcome at profile q if it is in the outcome at profile p, whenever q
is obtained from p by changing only the preference of some voters with a preference like R′ at which
b is preferred to a to a preference R obtained by swapping the position of a and b in R′. In this way
monotonicity is defined pairwise but it is sensitive to the positions of candidates. It is therefore satisfied
by many rules. Discrimination means , that a rule cannot be indifferent between two candidates, say a
and b, whenever frequency of every preference R at which a is preferred to b out numbers frequency of
R′. Here R′ is the preference obtained by swapping the position of a and b in R.
In the next part, for Condorcet consistent rules, Borda rule and plurality rule we show that, all three
assign the mode at the following type of perturbed unimodal distribution. Frequency declines with the
distance to the mode until about half the maximal distance1. Beyond this point frequencies are free but
constant at each specific distance from the mode and they are bounded above by the frequency at half the
maximal distance. The combinatorial reasoning by which these results are deduced might work similarly
for other collective decision rules such as other score rules or some elimination rules. But we have not
found a general method to deduce this, for instance, for all score rules. The result found here indicate,
however, that the mode choice of Condorcet consistent rules, Borda rule and plurality rule are robust to
considerable perturbations in the tail part of a single mode distribution. For a multimodal distribution,
we show that the outcomes at each of the unimodal constituents together determine the outcome of the
original distribution. For instance, fordiscriminating collective decision rules we show, that the outcome
1 Taking m the number of candidates maximally
(m
2
)
pairs can be discordant.
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at the union of two unimodal distributions is between the two modes of these unimodal distributions. This
result generalises to superpositions of more than two unimodal distributions. However, it is evident that at
these distributions, particularly when the modes have an empty intersection, we might end up in difficult
situations like Condorcet profiles. A deeper study of these situations is certainly necessary, but beyond
the scope of this first exploration of unimodal distributions.
There have been some empirical work with the so-called impartial culture or uniform distribution,
where each preference order is possible and occurs with equal probability. Under this assumption, the
probability of a majority cycle occurring has been calculated (see Gehrlein (2006) [?], Riker (1982,
p. 122)[?]. Many authors have noted that the impartial culture is a significant idealisation that almost
certainly does not occur in real-life elections. Grofman et al. (2003)[?] go even further arguing that the
impartial culture is a worst-case scenario in the sense that any deviation results in lower probabilities
of a majority cycle (see Grofman et al. (2006)[?], for a complete discussion of this issue). A few other
probabilistic models have been developed, for instance, Multinomial likelihood models (Gillett, 1976[?],
1978[?]), Dual Culture (Gehrlein; 1978)[?], Maximal Culture Condition (Fishburn and Gehrlein, 1977
[?]). All these indicate that when voters’ preferences are homogeneous, there is a increased likelihood that
a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner exists meaning that Condorcet cycles are avoided. Our result go further
on this as at unimodal distributions not only pairwise majority cycles are absent, but also all well-know
rules have the same outcome: the mode. The main difference in our approach is that the distributions are
structured by the Kemeny distance. A structure that is naturally embedded with the preferences. Merlin et.
al. (2004)[?] have studied the probability of conflicts in a U.S. presidential type of election. Their results
partially resemble ours, but strictly speaking are not comparable, because of the assumption of impartial
culture.
In section ?? we formally introduce the model. Section ?? shows that at unimodal distributions many
collective decision rules select the mode as an outcome. In section ?? we formulate some sufficiency con-
ditions for abstract collective decision rules to have the mode as an outcome at such distributions. Section
?? discusses disturbances in the ”tail” of unimodal distributions. Section ?? is on multimodal distribu-
tions. A discussion in section ?? concludes this paper. To make the paper self contained we provided an
appendix section ?? on combinatorial results needed in this paper.
2 Model
We consider a finite but large set of voters N = {1, . . . ,n}, and a finite set of candidates A= {a1, . . . ,am}.
We assume that there are at least three candidates, hence m≥ 3.
Let R denote a relation on A, i.e. R⊆ A×A. As usual for candidates x and y, (x,y) ∈ R means that at
preference (relation) R, candidate x is (weakly) 2 preferred to candidate y. Individual preferences of voters
are formalized here by linear orders, i.e. complete, antisymmetric and transitive relations on A. The set of
these linear orders on A is denoted by L. Let −R denote the reverse of R, i.e. −R = {(x,y) : (y,x) ∈ R}.
For candidates x and y let τxy denote the permutation on A defined τxy(z) = z if z /∈ {x,y}, τxy(x) = y
and τxy(y) = x. Now τxyR denotes the preference relation where the positions of x and y are swapped, i.e.
τxyR= {(τxy(v),τxy(w)) : (v,w) ∈ R}.
A profile p (of individual preferences) assigns to every voter i a linear order p(i) in L. Let LN denote
the set of all these profiles, that is the set of all the combinations of individual preferences. To exclude
discussions on resolving ties in the collective orders we allow the collective outcomes to be weak orders,
i.e. complete and transitive orders on A. The set of all these weak orders is denoted byW. Further, τxyp is
the coordinate-wise extension of τxy. So, (τxyp)(i) = τxy(p(i)). For non-empty subsets of voters S profiles
q and p are called S-deviations if p(i) = q(i) for all i ∈ N−S. Further, p|S denotes the profile p restricted
to S.
2 If x= y, then x and y are indifferent. If x ̸= y, then x is strictly preferred to y.
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For candidates x and y let Lxy denote the set of linear orders R at which x is strictly preferred to y, that
is Lxy = {R ∈ L|(x,y) ∈ R}.
The collective decision is formalized by a (preference) rule3. From now onwards we use just rule
instead of preference rule. F, a function that assigns to every profile p in LN a collective preference F(p)
inW.
2.1 Unimodal Frequency Distributions
A frequency distribution is formalized by a function representing the number of times each linear order
appear in a profile. Given a profile p of individual preferences of the voters and a preference R in L, then
f (R, p) denotes the number of voters with preference R at profile p, that is
f (R, p) = |{i ∈ N | p(i) = R}|,
where |S| denotes the cardinality of an arbitrary set S. There is a metric space over L induced by the
Kemeny distance function d defined for two preferences R1 and R2 in L as follows4
d(R1,R2) =
1
2
|(R1△ R2)|,
where △ denotes the symmetric difference between sets, i.e. R1△ R2 = (R1−R2)∪ (R2−R1). The
Kemeny distance indicates the number of discordant pairs.
A profile p is called unimodal if there exists a preference R̂, the mode, such that for every two prefer-
ences R1 and R2 in L, such that d(R̂,R1)< d(R̂,R2), then we have f (R1, p)> f (R2, p).
So, a profile p is unimodal if there is a preference R̂ in L with highest frequency, such that frequencies
for all other preferences in L strictly decrease in their distance from this mode R̂. A unimodal distribution
is called symmetrical if in addition f (R1, p) = f (R2, p) whenever d(R̂,R1) = d(R̂,R2).
Example 1 Example of a symmetric unimodal distribution with 4 candidates a,b,c,d.
3 Preference rules are usually known as Social Welfare Functions. As the model discussed here also applies to non-welfare issues
such as voting we rather use the term preference rule.
4 Here we actually take half the Kemeny distance because between two linear orderings it is a multiple of two.
Frequency Based Analysis of Voting Rules 5
adbc
bcad
dacb
cbda
abdc
dcab
bacd
cdba
dbac
acdb
bdca
cabd
bdac
acbd
dbca
cadb
badc
dcbaabcd
cdab
dabc
bcda
adcb
cbad
||
|
|
|
|
||
|
||
|
| |
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
Fig. 1: Symmetric unimodal distribution with 4 candidates
For 4 candidates we have 4! = 24 many linear orders in the set L. This set L can be structured by
the Kemeny distance as is shown in the above figure ??: the truncated octahedron. In this structure, an
edge between two linear orders means that these have Kemeny distance 1, i.e. they differ by only one
swap of consecutively ordered candidates. For instance, take abcd and bacd. Now we have a frequency
distribution on this structure with mode at abcd. The frequency of abcd is indicated by the length of the
red bar. Going one step (in the Kemeny sense) away from abcd, we have three linear orders, namely,
bacd,acbd,abdc. Their frequencies are lesser compared the mode. For this example, we have taken equal
frequencies, so the distribution is symmetric. Their frequencies are indicated by the length of the yellow
bars. Similarly we have declining frequencies for the linear orders at distances 2,3,4,5 and 6 from the
mode abcd. This same distribution can be viewed as a flat bar chart, where we use the same colors to
indicate that those linear orders are at the same distance from the mode. Of course a lot of information is
lot transferring from the Kemeny structure to 2 dimensional bar chart.
2.2 Definitions of Some Conditions
Preference rules will be discussed with respect to the following conditions.
Anonymitymeans that the rule is symmetric in its arguments. Anonymity guarantees that every voters’
preference is equally important in determining the outcome. The outcome is based on how many times a
preference is announced at a certain profile instead of who announced that preference. Let σ : N → N be
a permutation on N the set of voters. Let p be a profile in LN . Then profile5 q = p ◦σ is defined for all
voters i by
q(i) = p(σ(i)).
Rule F is anonymous if for all profiles p and all permutations σ
5 Note that we consider a profile to be a function from N to L.
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F(p) = F(p◦σ).
Neutrality means that the rule treats candidates in equal situations equally. Let x and y be candidates.
Let τxy be a permutation on A, where it swaps the positions of x,y ∈ A. Rule F is neutral6 if for all
candidates x and y, all profiles p and all τxy on A
F(τxyp) = τxyF(p).
Monotonicity means that if in comparison of profiles p and q the preference ”x is preferred to y”
among the voters increases when going from p to q, then this preference at the outcomes should not
decrease.
Rule F is monotone if for all candidates x and y , all non-empty subsets S of N and all S-deviations p
and q, such that both q(i) = τxyp(i) and (y,x) ∈ p(i) for all i ∈ S (y,x) /∈ F(p) implies (y,x) /∈ F(q).
Discriminationmeans that for candidates x and y at a profile p the outcome F(p) is indifferent between
these two only if there are R1 at which x is strictly preferred to y and R2 at which y is strictly preferred to
x such that f (Rt , p)> f (τxyRt , p) for both t ∈ {1,2}. So, indifference between x and y in an outcome can
only occur if neither all for all R ∈ Lxy frequencies f (R, p) are strictly greater than f (τxyR, p) nor for all
R ∈ Lyx frequencies f (R, p) are strictly greater than f (τxyR, p).
Rule F discriminates if for all profiles p and all different candidates x and y
(x,y) ∈ F(p) and (y,x) ∈ F(p) implies , that there are preferences R1 ∈ Lxy and R2 ∈ Lyx with
f (Rt , p)> f (τxyRt , p) for all both t ∈ {1,2}.
It should be clear, that one equality between frequencies f (R, p) and f (τxyR, p) for some linear order
is sufficient to allow for an indifference outcome between x and y at a discriminating rule. This is also
allowed in cases where f (R1, p) > f (τxyR1, p) and f (R2, p) > f (τxyR2, p) for some R1 ∈ Lxy and some
R2 ∈ Lyx. But in cases where f (R, p) > f (τxyR, p) for all R ∈ Lxy discrimination implies the preference
between x and y is strict. It is natural to go one step further in those cases and to impose, that in those
situations x should be strictly preferred to y. This condition is referred to as positive discrimination.
So, rule F positively discriminates if for all profiles p and all different candidates x and y (x,y)∈ F(p)
and (y,x) /∈ F(p) whenever f (R, p)> f (τxyR, p) for all R ∈ Lxy.
As we frequently use the terms Condorcet consistent rules and pairwise rules in the following sections,
let us clarify what we mean by them. Firstly a pairwise comparison matrix is a square matrix with its
(i, j)th element as the number of voters preferring the ith candidate to the jth candidate, and all the diagonal
elements are zero. Pairwise rules are the rules that provide the same outcome for two different preference
profiles as long as the pairwise comparison matrix resulting from these two preference profiles are the
same. A Condorcet consistent choice rule chooses the Condorcet winner if it exists. In case of a Condorcet
consistent preference rule, the Condorcet order is chosen if it exists. A pairwise rule may not be Condorcet
consistent, for example, Borda rule is pairwise but it is not Condorcet consistent. It is not difficult to see,
that score rules as well as Condorcet consistent rules or pairwise rules are positively discriminating and
monotone. The proofs for this are essentially given in Examples ?? and ?? in Section ??.
3 Decisions in Unimodal Frequency Distributions
The following examples show that, at unimodal distributions the mode is the outcome of several well-
known decision rules like score rules, Condorcet consistent or pairwise rules and the Coombs rule. There
are many more rules that have the mode as outcome at these frequency distributions. Instead of proving
6 The neutrality notion defined here is equivalent to the usual one, because every permutation can be decomposed into pairwise
swaps like τxy.
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this we formulate sufficient conditions for an arbitrary rule to assign the mode at such frequency distri-
butions. In all these examples let p̂ be a unimodal profile with mode R̂. The result of these examples are
based on the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Let x and y be two different preferences and R1, R2 be two linear orders, such that (x,y) ∈
R1and (y,x) ∈ R2. Then d(R1,τxyR2)< d(R1,R2).
Proof We partition A\{x,y} as follows:
B1 ={a ∈ A : (a,x) ∈ R1 and (a,y) ∈ R2},
B2 ={a ∈ A : (a,x) ∈ R1 and (a,x),(y,a) ∈ R2},
B3 ={a ∈ A : (a,x) ∈ R1 and (x,a) ∈ R2},
M1 ={a ∈ A : (x,a),(a,y) ∈ R1 and (a,y) ∈ R2},
M2 ={a ∈ A : (x,a),(a,y) ∈ R1 and (a,x),(y,a) ∈ R2},
M3 ={a ∈ A : (x,a),(a,y) ∈ R1 and (x,a) ∈ R2},
W1 ={a ∈ A : (y,a) ∈ R1 and (a,y) ∈ R2},
W2 ={a ∈ A : (y,a) ∈ R1 and (a,x),(y,a) ∈ R2} and
W3 ={a ∈ A : (y,a) ∈ R1 and (x,a) ∈ R2}.
The following pictures the preferences R1, R2 and τxyR2.
B1∪B2∪B3 x M1∪M2∪M3 y W1∪W2∪W3 : R1
B1∪M1∪W1 y B2∪M2 ∪W2 x B3∪M3∪W3 : R2
B1∪M1∪W1 x B2∪M2 ∪W2 y B3∪M3∪W3 : τxyR2
Now
d(R1,R2) =
1
2
|[(R1△ R2)∩ (A−{x,y})2]|+ |B2|+2 · |B3|+
|M1|+2 · |M2|+ |M3|+2 · |W1|+ |W2|+1
=d(R1,τxyR2)+2 · |M2|+1
>d(R1,τxyR2),
which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2 Let x, y ∈ A, with (y,x) /∈ R̂ and let R ∈ Lxy. Then f (R, p̂)> f (τxyR, p̂).
Proof By Lemma ?? it follows that d(R̂,R)< d(R̂,τxyR) which easily yields the desired inequality by the
unimodality of p̂. ⊓⊔
Example 2 Condorcet consistent Rules
Condorcet consistent rules depend on pairwise majority comparisons of the candidates. In general
these comparisons may yield cycles and rules therefore may differ in these situations: different Condorcet
consistent rules break up cycles in different ways. If, however, at a certain profile pairwise majority
comparisons yield a complete, strict and transitive order from overall winner (the Condorcet winner) to
overall loser (the Condorcet loser), then this is the outcome of all these rules at that profile. We argue that
at profile p̂ pairwise majority comparisons yield the mode R̂ as the Condorcet order. Herewith we show
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that all Condorcet consistent preference rules assign the mode at a unimodal profile. Let (x,y) ∈ R̂, with
x ̸= y. It is sufficient to show that
|{i ∈ N : (x,y) ∈ p̂(i)}|> |{i ∈ N : (y,x) ∈ p̂(i)}|.
Lemma ?? yields that f (R, p̂)> f (τxyR, p̂) for all R∈Lxy. Since, |{i∈N : (x,y)∈ p̂(i)}|= ∑
R∈Lxy
f (R, p̂)
and |{i ∈ N : (y,x) ∈ p̂(i)}|= ∑
R∈Lxy
f (τxyR, p̂) the desired inequality follows.
Example 3 Score Rules
In score rules voters assign scores s1,s2, . . . ,sm to the candidates and these are then ordered according
to their total scores. It is assumed that sm > sm−1 > . . .> s1 and that sm > s1. At a preference p(i) voter i
would hand out score sm to his best candidate, sm−1 to his second best and so on. So, his worst candidate
receives score s1. Let rank(x, p(i)) = |{y∈ A : (x,y)∈ p(i)}| be the rank of candidate x at preference p(i).
Then of course the rank of the best candidate is equal to m the number of candidates and that of the worst
candidate is equal to one. Voter i assigns the scores as follows s(x, p(i)) = srank(x,p(i)) and total score for
candidate x at profile p is now s(x, p) = ∑
i∈N
s(x, p(i)). Define score rule Fs , with scores s, for candidates
x and y and an arbitrary profile p as follows
(x,y) ∈ Fs(p) if and only if s(x, p)> s(y, p)
In order to show that Fs(p̂) = R̂, let (x,y) ∈ R̂ with x ̸= y. It is sufficient to show that s(x, p̂)> s(y, p̂).
For numbers v and w let Lvwxy = {R ∈ Lxy : rank(x,R) = v and rank(y,R) = w}. Note that
s(x, p̂) =
v=m
∑
v=2
w=v−1
∑
w=1
 ∑
R∈Lvwxy
sv · f (R, p̂)+ ∑
R∈Lvwyx
sw · f (R, p̂)

=
v=m
∑
v=2
w=v−1
∑
w=1
 ∑
R∈Lvwxy
sv · f (R, p̂)+ sw · f (τxyR, p̂)

and similarly
s(y, p̂) =
v=m
∑
v=2
w=v−1
∑
w=1
 ∑
R∈Lvwxy
sv · f (τxyR, p̂)+ sw · f (R, p̂)
 .
Therefore it is sufficient to show that for all numbers v and w, with v> w, and all R ∈ Lvwxy
sv · f (R, p̂)+ sw · f (τxyR, p̂)> sv · f (τxyR, p̂)+ sw · f (R, p̂),
and that at least one of these inequalities is strict. The latter equality is equivalent to
(sv− sw) · ( f (R, p̂)− f (τxyR, p̂))> 0
Because v > w we have that sv > sw, where by definition sm > s1. Lemma ?? yields that f (R, p̂)−
f (τxyR, p̂)> 0. So, the weak inequality follows readily. Strictness follows because at some preference R
candidate x is ordered best and candidate y is ordered worst.
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4 Sufficient Conditions for Choosing the Mode
Here we state a set of sufficient conditions for arbitrary rules such that these have the mode as the outcome
at unimodal preference distributions. As many rules satisfy these conditions we consider them as weak.
Monotonicity as well as (positive) discrimination is closely related to the result spelled out by Lemma ??.
Theorem 1 Let p be a unimodal profile with mode R̂. Then F(p) = R̂ for a rule F from LN toW in each
of the following two cases:
1. F is positively discriminating;
2. F is anonymous, neutral, monotone and discriminating.
Proof It is sufficient to prove that (x,y)∈ F(p) and (y,x) /∈ F(p). Let R∈Lxy. As Lemma ?? implies that
d(R̂,τxyR)> d(R̂,R), because p is unimodal it follows for all R ∈ Lxy, that f (R, p)> f (τxyR, p). But then
(x,y) ∈ F(p) and (y,x) /∈ F(p) because F is positively discriminating.
Lemma ?? together with part (1) imply part (2). ⊓⊔
Lemma 3 Let F be a rule from LN to W which is neutral, anonymous, monotone and discriminating.
Then F is positively discriminating.
Proof In order to prove the second case let F be anonymous, neutral, monotone and discriminating. Let
p be a profile and x and y be different candidates such that for all R ∈ Lxy frequencies f (R, p) are strictly
greater than f (τxyR, p). It is sufficient to prove that (x,y)∈F(p) and (y,x) /∈F(p). By discrimination of F
we have that (x,y) /∈ F(p) or (y,x) /∈ F(p). To the contrary suppose (x,y) /∈ F(p). It is sufficient to prove
a contradiction. As F(p) is a weak order, hence complete, (y,x) ∈ F(p) and (x,y) /∈ F(p). Furthermore,
neutrality implies (y,x) /∈ F(τxyp) and (x,y) ∈ F(τxyp). Now for all R ∈ Lxy
f (τxyR,τxyp) = f (R, p)> f (τxyR, p) = f (R,τxyp).
This means that at profile τxyp every R ∈ Lxy is outnumbered by the frequency of τxyR which is in
Lyx. Therefore at τxyp we can distinguish a non-empty subset S of N such that
1. f (R,(τxyp)|N−S) = f (τxyR,(τxyp)|N−S) for all R ∈ Lxy and
2. (x,y) /∈ τxyp(i) for all i ∈ S.
Consider profile q such that q( j) = τxyp( j) for all j ∈ N− S and q(i) = τxy(τxyp(i)) = p(i) for all
i ∈ S.Monotonicity and (y,x) /∈ F(τxyp) imply (y,x) /∈ F(q). Hence, (x,y) ∈ F(q) and (y,x) /∈ F(q). Next
we show that f (R,q) = f (R, p) for all R in L. For R in Lxy this follows because f (R,q) = f (R,q|S)+
f (R,q|N−S)= f (R, p|S)+ f (R,(τxyp)|N−S)= f (R, p|S)+ f (τxyR,(τxyp)|N−S)= f (R, p|S)+ f (R, p|N−S)=
f (R, p). For R inLyx note that f (R, p|S)= f (R,q|S)= 0 as (y,x) /∈ p(i) by the choice of S. So, the sequence
of equations above alters to f (R,q)= f (R,q|S)+ f (R,q|N−S)= f (R,(τxyp)|N−S)= f (τxyR,(τxyp)|N−S)=
f (R, p|S)+ f (R, p|N−S) = f (R, p). But then by anonymity we have F(q) = F(p), which cannot be be-
cause (x,y) ∈ F(q) and (x,y) /∈ F(p). ⊓⊔
The following example shows that the conditions in Theorem ?? case 2 are logically independent.
Example 4 Independence of anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity and discrimination
Let the dictatorial rule Fdict,i with dictator i be defined for a profile p as Fdict,i(p) = p(i). So, this
rule assigns the preference of voter i independent of the preferences of all other voters. Note that Fdict,i is
neutral, monotone and discriminating but of course not anonymous.
For a weak order R on A let the constant rule Fconst,R be defined for a profile p as Fconst,R(p) = R.
So, this rule assigns relation R independent of the preferences of the voters. Note that if R ∈ L, then
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Fconst,R is anonymous, monotone and discriminating but not neutral, where if R = A×A, then Fconst,A×A
is anonymous, neutral and monotone, but not discriminating.
Let the reverse transitive closure of pairwise majority rule Fodd be defined for a profile p and a pair of
candidates x and y as follows, (x,y) ∈ Fodd(p) if and only if there are y = z0,z1, . . . ,zk = x such that for
all 0< j 6 k
|{i ∈ N : (z j,z j−1) ∈ p(i)}|> |{i ∈ N : (z j−1,z j) ∈ p(i)}|.
It is straightforward to prove that Fodd is neutral, anonymous and discriminating. It is clearly not
monotone.
It is clear that for instance Condorcet consistent or pairwise rules as well as score rules are posi-
tively discriminating and therefore by Theorem ?? their outcome equals the mode at unimodal distributed
profiles.
An application of the second case of Theorem ?? can be found in the following example.
Example 5 Score-wise Elimination
Consider score rules introduced in Example ??. Let sk = (sk1,s
k
2, . . . ,s
k
k) ∈ Rk for each k from 1 to m,
with skk > skk−1 > . . .> sk1 and skk > sk1. Based on these score vectors the rule sequentially eliminates those
alternatives which have lowest score. Here for a subset B of A the scores are determined for an arbitrary
candidate b in B and profile p as follows
score(sk,b, p|B) = ∑
i∈N
score(sk,b, p|B),
where |B|= k, score(sk,b, p|B) = skr(x,p(i)|B) and r(x, p(i)|B) = |{x ∈ B : (b,x) ∈ p(i)|B}|. So, in round
0 set A0 = A and
C0(p) = {a ∈ A : score(sm,x, p)> score(sm,a, p) for all x ∈ A}.
Now for each proceeding round l > 0 define Al = Al−1−Cl−1(p), and take
Cl(p) = {a ∈ Al : score(sk,x, p|Al )> score(sk,a, p|Al ) for all x ∈ Al}
and Al+1 = Al−Cl(p) if |Al |= k > 0
Cl(p) = Al+1 = /0 else.
The outcome of the score-wise elimination rule Felimination is now defined for an arbitrary pair of
candidates and profile p as follows
(x,y) ∈ Felimination(p) if and only if y ∈ Al implies x ∈ Al for all l ≥ 0.
In case sk equals the anti-plurality scores, i.e. (1,1,1, ...,1,1,0) for all k, this score-wise elimination
equals Coombs rule, in case it equals Borda score, i.e. (k,k−1, ...,2,1) it equals Nanson rule. The class
is much richer though as for instance resemblance between the score vectors at different rounds of k
need not exist. We end this example by arguing that all score-wise elimination rules assign the mode to
unimodal profiles. The argument is based on Theorem ?? case 2. By definition these elimination rules
are neutral and anonymous. Note that these rules are monotone. Taking profiles p and q and candidates
x and y as in the definition. At every subset of candidates in which these two are present the scores of
all others is not affected and that of x is weakly increased where that of y is weakly decreased while
going from p to q. Next we show that these rules are discriminating. Let at profile p and at subset B, with
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|B|= k, candidates x and y both be eliminated at round t, where p,x and y are chosen as in the definition
of discrimination.
Then scores of these at p|B are equal. Now as stk > st1 it cannot be that f (R, p)> f (τxyR, p) for all linear
orders R∈Lxy. As this would yield f (R|B, p|B)> f ((τxyR)|B, p|B) for all linear orders R∈Lxy, which can
both not hold because of score being equal at p|B where stt > st1. Similarly not f (R, p)> f (τxyR, p) for all
linear orders R ∈ Lyx. So, we have that these rules are discriminating. By Theorem ?? case 2 they assign
the mode at unimodal distributions.
5 Robustness of the Mode-selection Property
So far we have studied behaviour of well-known rules under the assumption that preference profiles have
a unimodal distribution. In this section we relax this assumption and try to analyse how sensitive the
results of Examples ?? and ?? are to perturbations of unimodal distributions. We confine our study here
to specific cases of perturbations and specific rules. Of course we tried to deduce the similar results for
more abstract rules like a subclass of score rules or abstract rules satisfying the sufficient conditions
of Theorem ?? Case 2, but were not able to do so. As for rules we only consider Borda, plurality and
Condorcet consistent rules. So, within the class of score rules we take two ’extreme’ cases: all scores are
different with equal margins (Borda) and except for the highest score all other scores are equal (Plurality).
We further only consider perturbations of the following kind. There is a linear order, say R∗, and a real
number ν such that
1. Frequencies are constant at any given distance from R∗. So, f (R1, p)= f (R2, p)whenever d(R1,R∗)=
d(R2,R∗) for all linear orders R1 and R2.
2. For linear orders R1, R2 and R3, with d(R1,R∗) < d(R2,R∗) 6 ν < d(R3,R∗) we have f (R1, p) >
f (R2, p)> f (R3, p).
Such distribution behave like a unimodal distribution with mode R∗ till distance ν from the mode and
thereafter frequency is bounded by the frequency at distance ⌊ν⌋7 but does not have to decline like in
unimodal distributions. We call such distributions ν-tail perturbed unimodal distributions around R∗.
Let ρ denote the radius distance, i.e. ρ = 12δ , where δ =
(m
2
)
denotes the diameter distance of L. In
all results we will take ρ 6 ν . So, seen from R∗ these perturbations only occur in the second half of the
set of linear orders. At such distributions frequency depends on the distance to R∗. Further, at distances
larger than radius distance, say δ − k, frequency is lower than at the ’opposite’ distance k.
The analysis needs some combinatorial results which are discussed in the Appendix. Also some ad-
ditional notations related to a (distance) k, candidates x and y, linear orders R and rank number r are
needed.
– Lk = {R ∈ L : d(R,R∗) = k}, i.e. the set of all linear orders on distance k from R∗. This set is equal to
{R ∈ L : d(R,−R∗) = δ − k}. Further, l(k) = |Lk| denotes the cardinality of Lk.
– Lkxy = Lxy∩Lk, i.e. the set of linear orders preferring x to y on distance k from R∗ and l(k,xy) = |Lkxy|
denotes the cardinality of Lkxy.
– Also throughout this section we write f (R) instead of f (R, p) and also write f (k) to indicate the
frequency of linear orders on distance k from R∗.
– l(k,x,r), i.e. number of all linear orders on distance k from R∗, where rank of x is r.
– Let l, δ and ρ refer function l in the case of m−1 candidates, the diameter and the radius in that case
respectively.
7 ⌊ν⌋ denotes the largest integer less than or equal to ν .
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Example 6 Example of a tail-perturbed unimodal distribution with 4 candidates a,b,c,d.
The following figure shows an example of a tail-perturbed unimodal distribution with 4 candidates.
Suppose abcd is the mode of the distribution. Thereafter frequencies decline till distance 3 (i.e., ν = 3).
After that frequencies fluctuate having an upper bound : the frequency at distance 3.
Fig. 2: Tail-perturbed unimodal distribution
In the following theorem we show that at such perturbations Condorcet consistent rules choose R∗.
Theorem 2 Let p have a ρ-tail perturbed unimodal distributions around R∗. Then R∗ is the Condorcet
order at p.
Proof Let (x,y) ∈R∗ for different candidates x and y. It is sufficient to prove that∑R∈Lxy f (R)− f (τxyR)>
0.
Note that
∑
R∈Lxy
f (R)− f (τxyR) =
δ
∑
k=0
 ∑
R∈Lkxy
f (R)− ∑
R∈Lkyx
f (R)

As for linear order R on distance ρ from R∗ linear order −R is also on distance ρ from R∗ and
frequencies are constant over a given distance we may exclude k= ρ from this sum and split it up to yield
∑
R∈Lxy
f (R)− f (τxyR) = ∑
0≤k<ρ
 ∑
R∈Lkxy
f (R)− ∑
R∈Lkyx
f (R)

+ ∑
0≤k<ρ
 ∑
R∈Lδ−kxy
f (R)− ∑
R∈Lδ−kyx
f (R)

= ∑
0≤k<ρ
l(k,xy) f (k)− l(k,yx) f (k)
+ ∑
0≤k<ρ
l(δ − k,xy) f (δ − k)− l(δ − k,yx) f (δ − k).
Where the latter equality follows by the assumptions on the frequency distribution. As further l(k,xy)=
l(δ − k,yx) because R ∈ Lkxy if and only if −R ∈ Lδ−kyx we have
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∑
R∈Lxy
f (R)− f (τxyR) = ∑
0≤k<ρ
l(k,xy)[ f (k)− f (δ − k)]+ l(k,yx)[( f (δ − k)− f (k)]
= ∑
0≤k<ρ
[l(k,xy)− l(k,yx)][ f (k)− f (δ − k)].
Now by Lemma ?? l(k,xy) > l(k,yx) for all 0 ≤ k ≤ ρ. The assumptions on the distribution show
that f (k)− f (δ − k) is positive for all 0 ≤ k ≤ ρ . For k = 0 it is obvious that l(k,xy) > l(k,yx) and
f (k)> f (δ − k). So, ∑R∈Lxy f (R)− f (τxyR) is strictly positive. ⊓⊔
Remark 1 In Theorem ?? the assumption on frequencies being constant on a given distance from R∗ can
be relaxed and further looking at the proof frequencies at distance ρ from R∗ need not be an upper bound
for frequencies at greater distances. That is in the same way we can prove that R∗ is the Condorcet order
if frequencies satisfy
min
R∈Lkxy
f (R)+ min
R∈Lδ−kxy
f (R)> max
R∈Lkyx
f (R)+ max
R∈Lδ−kyx
f (R) for all 0≤ k < ρ.
As by the second equation in the foregoing proof we have
∑
R∈Lxy
f (R)− f (τxyR)> ∑
0≤k<ρ
l(k,xy) · min
R∈Lkxy
f (R)− l(k,yx) · max
R∈Lkyx
f (R)
l(−k,xy) · min
R∈L−kxy
f (R)− l(−k,yx) · max
R∈L−kyx
f (R)
= ∑
0≤k<ρ
l(k,xy) ·
(
min
R∈Lkxy
f (R)− max
R∈L−kyx
f (R)
)
− l(k,yx) ·
(
max
R∈Lkyx
f (R)− min
R∈L−kxy
f (R)
)
.
Now as l(k,xy)> l(k,yx) and the assumption the result follows.
Example 7 Performance of Condorcet consistent rules under tail perturbed unimodal distribution
Fig. 3: Robustness of Condorcet consistent rules
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In the above figure ??, we show a voting situation with tail-perturbed unimodal frequencies satisfying
the conditions given in remark ??. Here we consider a voting situation with 4 candidates a,b,c,d. abcd
is the mode of the distribution. Thereafter frequencies decline till radius distance ρ = 3. Here it is also
possible to have different frequencies at the same distance from the mode. After radius frequencies are
just bounded by the minimum frequency at the same distance from dcba, the reverse mode. Also, till the
radius, maximum frequency at any distance from the mode is lesser than the minimum frequency at any
distances closer to the mode.
Next we check for sensitivity of the Borda rule. Borda rule is based on Borda score. Borda score of
a candidate x is the number of candidates below x in a preference R, summed over all preferences. We
show that for perturbed distributions discussed above, the Borda rule chooses R∗ as the outcome.
Theorem 3 Let p have a ρ-tail perturbed unimodal distributions around R∗. Then Borda rule assigns
outcome R∗ to p.
Proof Let scores st be the Borda scores, i.e. st = t for all 1 6 t 6 m. Take (x,y) ∈ R∗ arbitrary where x
and y are different candidates. It is sufficient to prove that s(x, p)> s(y, p). Note for each distance k to R∗
Borda score of candidate x satisfies
∑
z∈A
l(k,xz) =
m
∑
r=1
r · l(k,x,r).
So, Borda score of candidate x equals
s(x, p) =
δ
∑
k=0
∑
z∈A
f (k) · l(k,xz)
= ∑
0≤k<ρ
∑
z∈A
f (k) · l(k,xz)+ f (δ − k) · l(δ − k,xz).
Where the latter equation follows because R is on distance ρ from R∗ then so is −R. Noting that
l(δ − k,ba) = l(k,ab) for all candidates a and b and all distances k between 0 and ρ we have
s(x, p) = ∑
0≤k<ρ
∑
z∈A
f (k) · l(k,xz)+ f (δ − k) · l(δ − k,xz)
= ∑
0≤k<ρ
∑
z∈A
f (k) · l(k,xz)+ f (δ − k) · l(δ − k)− f (δ − k) · l(δ − k,zx)
= ∑
0≤k<ρ
∑
z∈A
[ f (k)− f (δ − k)] · l(k,xz)+ f (δ − k) · l(δ − k).
Hence,
s(x, p)− s(y, p) = ∑
0≤k<ρ
∑
z∈A
[ f (k)− f (δ − k)] · [l(k,xz)− l(k,yz)] .
Note that for k = 0 we obviously have that ∑z∈A l(k,xz)− l(k,yz) > 0. So, by the assumptions on
frequency distribution f and Lemma ?? we are done. ⊓⊔
Similar to the case with Condorcet consistent rules, here also we mention a more general version of
the result in the following Remark.
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Remark 2 Looking at the proof of Theorem ?? it is clear that the same result can be deduced in case the
distribution satisfies
f (k)> f (δ − k) for all 0≤ k < ρ.
Example 8 Performance of Borda rule under tail perturbed unimodal distribution
Fig. 4: Robustness of Borda rule
In this example we show a voting situation with tail-perturbed unimodal frequencies satisfying the
condition given in remark ??. Unlike example ??, here we have equal frequencies at the same distance
from the mode.
Finally we show that the outcome of plurality rule at ν-tail perturbed unimodal distributions towards
R∗ is equal to R∗.We need ν to be equal to µ = 12
(m−1
2
)
+m− 32 .
Plurality rule is based on plurality score. That is the number of times a candidate is at the top of voter’s
preferences, i.e. having rank m at the preference of an agent. It ranks the candidates according to their
plurality scores. Consider profile p having µ-tail perturbed unimodal distributions towards R∗. Let pl(x)
denote this plurality score for candidate x. In this situation we have
pl(x) =
δ
∑
k=0
l(k,x,m) · f (k).
Let rx be the rank of x in R∗. Then for any distance k > ux, with ux = m− rx we have that l(k,x,m) =
l(k−ux).Where l(k−ux) denotes the number of preferences at distance k−ux from R∗ the restriction of
R∗ to A−{x}. This is because it needs precisely ux swaps to bring x to the top at a preference when at
start its rank is rx. Denoting the diameter of the set of linear orders on m−1 candidates by δ we therefore
have
pl(x) =
δ+ux
∑
k=ux
l(k−ux) · f (k).
The above sum is over all k ∈ {ux,ux+ 1, . . . ,δ + ux}, because if k is outside this range, l(k− ux) is
not defined. Now we can prove the following result on plurality rule.
Theorem 4 Let p have a µ-tail perturbed unimodal distributions around R∗. Then the outcome of Plu-
rality rule at p equals R∗.
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Proof Let x and y be different candidates such that (x,y) ∈ R∗. It is sufficient to prove pl(x)− pl(y)> 0.
Let rx and ry denote the rank of x and y in R∗ respectively. Let ux =m−rx and uy =m−ry. rx > ry implies
ux < uy. Then pl(x)− pl(y) is equal to
δ+ux
∑
k=ux
l(k−ux) · f (k)−
δ+uy
∑
k=uy
l(k−uy) · f (k).
Take µxy the average of ρ+ux and ρ+uy, so µxy = ρ+ 12 (ux+uy), where ρ is the radius distance of
the set of linear orders on m− 1 candidates. Defining l(k) to be zero if k is not in the interval [0,δ ] we
have that pl(x)− pl(y) is equal to
∑
ux6k≤µxy
[
l(k−ux)− l(k−uy)
] · f (k)+ ∑
µxy<k≤δ+uy
[
l(k−ux)− l(k−uy)
] · f (k).
For k= µxy = ρ+ 12 (ux+uy) we have l(k−ux) = l(ρ+ 12 (uy−ux)) and l(k−uy) = l(ρ− 12 (uy−ux)).
As l is symmetric around ρ it follows that
[
l(k−ux)− l(k−uy)
] · f (k) is zero for k = µxy. So, pl(x)−
pl(y) is equal to
∑
ux6k<µxy
[
l(k−ux)− l(k−uy)
] · f (k)+ ∑
µxy<k≤δ+uy
[
l(k−ux)− l(k−uy)
] · f (k)
Substituting k′ = δ +ux+uy− k,
= ∑
ux6k<µxy
[
l(k−ux)− l(k−uy)
] · f (k)+
∑
ux6k′<µxy
[
l((δ +uy)− (k′−ux)−ux)− l((δ +uy)− (k′−ux)−uy)
]
· f ((δ +uy)− (k′−ux)).
As
l((δ +uy)− (k′−ux)−ux)− l((δ +uy)− (k′−ux)−uy) · f ((δ +uy)− (k′−ux))
=
[
l(δ +uy− k′)− l(δ +ux− k′)
]
· f (δ +ux+uy− k′)
and l(δ +uy− k′) = l(k′−uy) and l(δ +ux− k′) = l(k′−ux) it follows that
pl(x)− pl(y) = ∑
ux6k<µxy
[
l(k−ux)− l(k−uy)
] · f (k)+
∑
ux6k<µxy
[
l(k−uy)− l(k−ux)
] · f (δ +ux+uy− k).
So,
pl(x)− pl(y) = ∑
ux6k<µxy
[
l(k−ux)− l(k−uy)
] · [ f (k)− f (δ +ux+uy− k)].
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By Lemma ?? it follows that the first factor in each term of this latter summation is positive and by the
assumptions on f that the second factor is positive. All in all therefore pl(x)− pl(y)> 0 which completes
the proof. ⊓⊔
Example 9 Performance of Plurality rule under tail perturbed unimodal distribution
Fig. 5: Robustness of plurality rule
Here is a voting situation with tail-perturbed unimodal frequencies satisfying conditions given in
theorem ??. For 4 candidates a,b,c,d we have µ = 4. So, disturbances happen only after distance 4 from
the mode abcd.
It is obvious that these conditions for choosing R∗ by Condorcet consistent, Borda and plurality rules
are not necessary.
6 Multimodal Frequency Distributions
Election outcomes often yield vote accumulations around several candidates or parties. It is therefore
possible that these consist of several unimodal distributions superposed on each other, where their modes
represent these spots of accumulation. In this section we study the case where two unimodal distribu-
tions are superposed on each. Here positively discriminating rules choose an outcome between these two
modes. The notion of betweenness means that the Kemeny distances between the outcome of the rule to
each mode precisely adds up to the distance between these two modi. So, the outcome can be seen as a
convex combination (in the Kemeny sense) of the two modes.
Let N1 and N2 be two disjoint sets of voters. Let p1 ∈ LN1 and p2 ∈ LN2 such that pt is a unimodal
profile on Nt with mode Rt for t ∈ {1,2}. Let N = N1∪N2 and p ∈ LN defined by p(i) = pt(i) if i ∈ Nt for
t ∈ {1,2}. In that case p is said to be a superposition of unimodal profiles p1 and p2. It is straightforward
to see that on such superposed profiles different rules may result in different outcomes. On the other hand
the following theorem shows that positively discriminating preference rules agree on the intersection of
these two modes.
Example 10 Example of multimodal distribution with 3 candidates a,b,c.
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Preferences p q p+q
abc 100 80 180
acb 80 60 140
bac 80 100 180
cab 60 20 80
bca 60 80 140
cba 20 60 80
Table 1: Multimodal distribution
+ ⇒
Fig. 6: Multimodal distribution
This example is to show how to form a multimodal distribution from two unimodal ones. We have 3
candidates a,b,c. So, the first column in table ?? lists the 6 possible linear orders. The second column
shows the frequencies corresponding to profile p. Notice that, abc is the mode at profile p. Similarly bac
is the mode at profile q shown in the third column. Now, adding the corresponding frequencies from p
and q we have a new profile p+ q shown in column 4. p+ q has two modes, namely abc and bac. The
same scenario is represented in the above figure ??.
Theorem 5 Let N1 and N2 be two disjoint non-empty sets of voters, such that N = N1∪N2. For t ∈ {1,2}
and let pt be a unimodal profile on Nt with mode Rt . Let p be the superposition of these two unimodal
profiles. Let F be a positively discriminating rule from LN toW.
Then (x,y) ∈ F(p) and (y,x) /∈ F(p) for all (x,y) ∈ R1∩R2, such that x ̸= y.
Proof Let (x,y)∈R1∩R2, with x ̸= y. It is sufficient to prove that (x,y)∈F(p) and (y,x) /∈F(p). Because
R1and R2 are linear orders it follows that (y,x) /∈ R1 and (y,x) /∈ R2 . Lemma ?? implies for all R ∈ Lxy
that
Frequency Based Analysis of Voting Rules 19
f (R, p1)> f (τxyR, p1) and f (R, p2)> f (τxyR, p2),
Therefore
f (R, p) = f (R, p1)+ f (R, p2)> f (τxyR, p1)+ f (τxyR, p2) = f (τxyR, p).
Positive discrimination implies that (x,y) ∈ F(p) and (y,x) /∈ F(p). ⊓⊔
Remark 3 Theorem ?? shows that in case of two superposed unimodal distributions, p, with modi R1
and R2 the asymmetric part of the outcome, F(p), of a positively discriminating rule, F, contains the
intersection of these two modi. Because the modi are complete and antisymmetric it follows that
(F(p)△R1)∪ (F(p)△R2) = (R1△R2).
So, F(p) is on a shortest path between R1 and R2.
By Lemma ?? this result is also implied if the rule is simultaneously neutral anonymous, monotone
and discriminating.
Note that this result generalises to any arbitrary number of superposed unimodal profiles. On the
other hand it is not difficult to find superposed unimodal profiles at which the standard problems of Social
Choice appear, such as for instance Condorcet cycles.
7 Conclusion
One of the main contribution of this paper is in recognizing a common trait in all well-known collective
decision rules, that they all choose the mode as the outcome in case the underlying frequency distribution
is unimodal. We also try to extend this result outside the domain of unimodal distribution. We present
some of the interesting rules like Condorcet consistent rules, Borda rule, Plurality rule retain their prop-
erty of choosing the mode even if the underlying distribution is ν−tail perturbed. As Borda rule and
Plurality rule are ”opposite extremes”in the class of score rules, we expect that a large subclass of score
rules also choose the mode at such ν−tail perturbed unimodal distribution. We also expect that it is pos-
sible to predict more about the outcome of multimodal distributions resulting from superposed unimodal
distributions.
8 Appendix
This appendix is on some combinatorial results used in the proofs above. Throughout this appendix let
x denote the top ordered candidate at R∗ and y the worst ordered candidate at R∗. Let R∗ = R∗|A\{x} and
R∗ = R∗|A\{y}. In several of the Lemmas below we use recursive formulae based on the cardinalities of
Lk = {R : R is a linear order on A\{x} with d(R,R∗) = k}, Lkxy = {R ∈ Lk : (x,y) ∈ R}, Lk = {R : R is
a linear order on A\{y} with d(R,R∗) = k} and Lkxy = {R ∈ Lk : (x,y) ∈ R}, where x and y are different
candidates such that in case of the first two sets x ̸= x and in case of latter two sets y ̸= y. Let these
cardinalities be denoted by l(k), l(k,xy), l(k) and l(k,xy) respectively. Further, let δ = 12 (m−1) · (m−2)
and ρ = 12δ denote the diameter and radius at m−1 candidates.
Because the numbers l(k), l(k) and l(k) do not depend on the actual naming of the candidates we
have that l(k) = l(k). As the position of the interval [x,y]R∗ = {z ∈ A : (x,z) ∈ R∗ and (z,y) ∈ R∗} differs
in R∗ from that in R∗ some care has to be taken with the numbers l(k,xy) and l(k,xy).We argue at a later
stage that these are equal as well. First we prove the following recursive relations for l(k).
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Lemma 4 For a distance k from R∗
l(k) =
min{k,m−1}
∑
t=0
l(k− t)
=
min{k,m−1}
∑
t=0
l(k− t)
Proof Set Lk consists of those linear orders at distance k− t from R∗, where x has been swapped t
positions downwards. As x can at most move overm−1 positions the recursive formula follows evidently.
The second equality follows similarly by deleting the worst ordered candidate but also because obviously
l(k− t) = l(k− t). ⊓⊔
Having this recursive relation on l(k) we can now prove that l(k) strictly increases in k that is for k
smaller than or equal to radius distance ρ. This completes the proof of Theorem ??.
Lemma 5 l(k1)< l(k2) for all k1 < k2 6 ρ .
Proof It is obvious that l(0) = l(0) = 1. To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to prove it for the special
case that k1 = k−1 and k2 = k, where k > 1. Hence we prove that l(k)− l(k−1)> 0 for all 16 k 6 ρ.
By the recursive formula of Lemma ?? we have, that if k 6 m−1, then
l(k)− l(k−1) = l(k),
else if k > m−1, then
l(k)− l(k−1) = l(k)− l(k−m),
Therefore in case k6m−1, from Lemma ?? it is obvious that l(k)− l(k−1) is positive. Now consider
the case k>m−1.As by assumption ρ > kwe have 14m(m−1)> k. So, k−m6 14m(m−1)−m= 14 (m2−
m−4m)< 14 (m2−3m+2) = 14 (m−1)(m−2) = ρ. Therefore it is sufficient to prove that ρ is closer to k
than k−m, i.e., k−ρ < ρ−k+m. This is equivalent to 2k< δ +m. As δ +m= 12 (m−1)(m−2)+m=
1
2 (m
2−3m+2+2m) = 12m(m−1)+1 the inequality 2k < δ +m is equivalent to k ≤ ρ. This proves the
Lemma. ⊓⊔
The following remarks are used later on.
Remark 4 (a) From the proof above we have that |k−ρ| < |k−m+1−ρ| for all k ≤ ρ.
(b) Noting that d(R,R∗) = d(−R,−R∗) and d(R∗,R)+ d(R,−R∗) = d(R∗,−R)+ d(−R,−R∗) = δ for
arbitrary linear orders R, we have that l(k) = l(δ −k) as well as l(k,xy) = l(δ −k,yx) for all distances
k and different candidates x and y.
(c) In particular (b) implies l(k,xy) = l(δ − k,yx) if k = ρ.
We now deduce recursive formula’s for l(k,xy).
Lemma 6 Let x and y be candidates.
(a) If x ̸= x, then l(k,xy) = ∑min{k,m−1}t=0 l(k− t,xy).
(b) If y ̸= y, then l(k,xy) = ∑min{k,m−1}t=0 l(k− t,xy).
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Proof (Proof of (a)) Let x ̸= x. Now every linear orders in Lkxy can be thought of as obtained from a linear
order at distance k− t from R∗ preferring x strictly to y and then shifting x over t position down. By this
the formula follows.
(Proof of (b)) Is similar. ⊓⊔
Next we show that l(k,xy) = l(k,ab) when cardinalities of the intervals [x,y]R∗ and [a,b]R∗ are equal.
Lemma 7 Let (x,y),(a,b) ∈ R∗, such that the cardinalities of [x,y]R∗ and [a,b]R∗ are equal, say κ . Then
l(k,xy) = l(k,ab).
Proof The proof is by induction on m> 3. The basis m= 3 is straightforward although a bit cumbersome
therefore it is left to the reader. So, here we only deduce the induction step and assume that m> 4.
In case the cardinalities of [x,y]R∗ and [a,b]R∗ are m, then x= a and y= b. So, in this case the equality
follows evidently. Therefore suppose that κ < m. Without loss of generality assume that (x,a) ∈ R∗ and
(a,x) /∈ R∗.
In case κ = m− 1 we have that x = x, b = y and l(k,xy) = ∑min{k,m−1}t=0 l(k− t,xy) and l(k,ab) =
∑min{k,m−1}t=0 l(k− t,ab). Now x is ordered best at R∗ and y is ordered worst at this order. Where a is
ordered best at R∗ and b is ordered worst at that order. Because the cardinalities of Lk and Lkxy do not
depend on the actual names of the candidates involved, we have l(k− t,xy) = l(k− t,ab) for appropriate
k and t. So, l(k,xy) = l(k,ab).
In case κ 6m−2 we can find (c,d)∈R∗ with the cardinalities of [c,d]R∗ is equal to κ, c ̸= x and d ̸= y.
Applying Lemma ?? yields that l(k,cd) = ∑min{k,m−1}t=0 l(k− t,cd) = ∑min{k,m−1}t=0 l(k− t,cd), l(k,xy) =
∑min{k,m−1}t=0 l(k− t,xy) and l(k,ab) = ∑min{k,m−1}t=0 l(k− t,ab). By the induction hypothesis we have that
l(k− t,cd) = l(k− t,xy) and l(k− t,cd) = l(k− t,ab) for appropriate k and t. So, l(k,xy) = l(k,cd) =
l(k,ab). ⊓⊔
By Lemma ?? we are able to argue that l(k,xy) = l(k,xy) as follows.
Lemma 8 For distance numbers k we have l(k,xy) = l(k,xy).
Proof Note that the cardinalities of Lk and Lkxy do not depend on the actual names of the candidates. So,
as shifting the interval [x,y]R∗ one position up and renaming the alternatives yields the interval [x,y]R∗ .
Lemma ?? implies that the shifting of the interval has no effect on the number l(k,xy) and renaming also
has no effect. So, l(k,xy) = l(k,xy). ⊓⊔
To complete the proof of Theorem ?? we prove the following.
Lemma 9 Let distance k ≤ ρ and let x and y be different candidates with (x,y) ∈ R∗. Then
l(k,xy)> l(k,yx).
Proof The proof is by induction on the number of candidates. The basis m = 3 is straight forward but
cumbersome. We leave it to the reader. The induction step where m≥ 4 is proved by two cases. In the first
case either x is not ordered best at R∗ or y is not ordered worst at R∗. Without loss of generality assume
that z is ordered worst at R∗, with z ̸= y. So, by Lemma ??
l(k,xy) =
min{k,m−1}
∑
t=0
l(k− t,xy).
As l(k) = ∑min{k,m−1}t=0 l(k− t) and l(s) = l(s,xy)+ l(s,yx) for all distances s, the induction argument
yields that l(s,xy) > 12 l(s) for all s < ρ. Therefore we have l(k,xy) >
1
2 l(k). Hence, the desired result
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follows in case k < ρ. For the case that k > ρ we can find a number u such that k = u+ ⌊ρ⌋. For
0 ≤ s ≤ u by Remark ?? (b) we have l(s+ ⌊ρ⌋) = l(⌈ρ⌉− s) and l(s+ ⌊ρ⌋,xy) = l(⌈ρ⌉− s,yx). This
means that ∑kt=⌈ρ⌉−u l(t,xy) =
1
2 ∑
k
t=⌊ρ⌋+1 l(t). Straightforwardly k < ρ and m ≥ 4 imply k < δ . Now
Remark ?? (a) and k < δ imply ⌈ρ⌉− u > max{k−m+ 1,0}. Therefore the induction argument yields
that l(k,xy)> 12 l(k) which proves this case.
Next consider the opposite case that is at R∗ candidate x is ordered best and candidate y is ordered
worst. Suppose candidate z is at position 8 t at R∗. We can now think of that an ordering in Lkxy, with top
z, is obtained from an ordering at distance k− t from R∗|A\{z}, where z has to move t positions to the top.
Clearly t ≤m−2 as otherwise this operation would result in an order at which y is above x. If z= x, then
this results in l(k) orderings. If z is at position 2, this results in l˜(k−1,xy) orders. If z is at position 3 in R∗
there are l˜(k−2,xy) orderings and so on, where l˜(k− t,xy) is the number of linear orders at distance k− t
from R∗|A\{z}. Note that because these numbers are independent of the actual candidate deleted, which
means l˜(.) is the same as l(.).
l(k,xy) = l(k)+
min{k,m−2}
∑
t=1
l(k− t,xy).
It is sufficient to prove that 2 · l(k,xy)− l(k) > 0. This means that we have to prove that 2 · l(k)+2 ·
∑min{k,m−2}t=1 l(k− t,xy)−∑min{k,m−1}t=0 l(k− t)> 0.
With the induction argument we have that 2 ·∑min{k,m−2}t=1 l(k− t,xy)−∑min{k,m−2}t=1 l(k− t)> 0. So, it
remains to prove that 2 · l(k)− l(k)− l(k−m+1,xy)> 0 or equivalently that l(k)> l(k−m+1,xy). As
by Remark ?? (a) k is closer to ρ than k−m+1 we have by Lemma ?? and in case k > ρ using Remark
?? (b) that l(k)> l(k−m+1)> l(k−m+1,xy) which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
The following Lemma completes the proof of Theorem ??.
Lemma 10 Let distance k ≤ ρ and let x and y be different candidates with (x,y) ∈ R∗. Then
∑
z∈A
l(k,xz)− l(k,yz)> 0.
Proof It is sufficient to proof this inequality for the case that x and y are consecutively ordered at R∗, that
is there are no candidate z, different from x and y, which are ordered between x and y at R∗. In view of
Lemma ?? we have that
∑
z∈A
l(k,xz)−∑
z∈A
l(k,yz) = l(k,xy)− l(k,yx).
Now as (x,y) and (x,y) are in R∗ it follows that by Lemma ?? that l(k,xy) > 12 l(k) > l(k,yx). This
implies the desired result. ⊓⊔
Let x and y be different candidates such that (x,y) ∈ R∗. It is sufficient to prove pl(x)− pl(y) > 0.
Let rx and ry denote the rank of x and y in R∗ respectively. Let ux = m− rx and uy = m− ry. Take µxy the
average of ρ+ux and ρ+uy, so µxy = ρ+ 12 (ux+uy), where ρ is the radius distance of the set of linear
orders on m−1 candidates. Let l(k) be zero if k is not in the interval [0,δ ].We need the following lemma
to complete the proof of Theorem ??.
Lemma 11 l(k−uy)< l(k−ux) for all k such that ux 6 k < µxy.
8 There are t−1 candidates ordered above z at R∗
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Proof By assumption we have that k−uy < k−ux. From ux 6 k we have k−ux > 0. From k < µxy, we
have that
k < ρ+
ux+uy
2
=⇒ 2k− (ux+uy)< δ
=⇒ (k−ux)−ρ < ρ− (k−uy)
If k−ux 6 ρ, then the above inequality implies k−uy < k−ux 6 ρ. From Lemma ??, it is obvious that
l(k−uy)< l(k−ux). Else if k−uy6 ρ < k−ux, then the above inequality implies that ρ is closer to k−ux
than it is to k−uy.Applying Lemma ?? and Remark ??, in this case also we have that l(k−uy)< l(k−ux).
This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
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